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On-demand streaming music services have expanded significantly in recent years. Services 
such as Spotify and Deezer are widely expected to become the dominant means of mass 
music consumption in the future and have been significant factors in helping recording 
industries in some countries arrest their long-term decline. The emergence of such services 
(especially the largest of them, Spotify) has caused controversy, however, with both major 
stars and smaller independent artists publicly criticising the low levels of royalty payments 
such services have thus far generated. This paper provides an overview of the controversy, 
concentrating on the criticisms of Spotify from independent labels and musicians. In such a 
rapidly-moving sector, it is unwise to offer any definitive predictions and thus the purpose of 
this paper is to outline as clearly as possible the parameters of the current debate. To 
achieve this, it considers the business models associated with streaming music and their 
place within the contemporary recorded music ecosystem, most notably in relation to 
piracy and declining record purchases. It concludes with a consideration of streaming 
services in relation to the broader power dynamics of the recording industry suggesting that 
while services like Spotify may cause problems for independent musicians they rely upon a 
logic of scaling that correlates with the existing practices of the major record labels. 
 




‘Let’s keep music special. F--- Spotify’. On-demand streaming and the 
controversy over artist royalties. 
 
One thing that the history of popular music tells us is that the introduction of 
significant new technologies is rarely uncontroversial. New inventions such as the 
microphone (Frith, 1986) or the sampler (Theberge, 2004) get challenged and ridiculed by 
parties whose interests may be threatened by new social practices of music-making and 
music-consuming. A recent example of this kind of conflict is the controversy over the 
amount of payment being given to artists for allowing their music to be made available on 
streaming services such Deezer and, especially, Spotify. It is a controversy that periodically 
appears in the mainstream media, such as Radiohead singer Thom Yorke’s proclamation that 
Spotify is the ‘last gasp of the old industry...the last desperate fart of a dying corpse’ (in 
Dredge, 2013a) or Taylor Swift’s decision to remove all of her back catalogue from the 
service upon the release of her 2014 album, 1989 (Dickey, 2014).  
The controversy is not merely a few superstars grumbling, however, as the majority 
of concerns have actually been raised by independent artists several rungs down the music 
industry ladder. While such discontent could perhaps be assumed to be merely an economic 
spat about how the pie should be divided it actually reflects more deep-seated uncertainties 
regarding the changing nature of the music commodity and its impact upon the perceived 
value of music, as well as more long-standing issues regarding the  
{page break in VoR} 
dominant power relations within the music industry. This latter point is notable because it 
contradicts a common perception that the disintermediating nature of the internet should 
be a boon to musicians beyond the major label system (for example, Baym, 2011; Wikstrom, 
2009), with the emergence of ‘long tail’ economics (Anderson, 2007) enabling unsigned 
artists to sell their music to a wide audience. However, the seemingly inexorable shift to 
streaming services has the potential to be a way through which old industry structures 
reassert themselves. Yorke is thus correct to associate Spotify with the ‘old industry’ but 
perhaps premature when describing it as a ‘dying corpse’. 
 




Before outlining details of the controversy, it is important to differentiate streaming 
music services.Often generically referred to as ‘music in the cloud’ (Morris, 2011), streaming 
services can be split into three types. The first is streaming radio (sometimes referred to as 
webcasting). This can simply be an online version of existing radio services, or online-only 
radio stations that specialise in particular genres or localities, but the more distinctive form 
is personalised, in that the service selects songs to play for each individual listener based on 
previous listening preferences. This kind of streaming radio service thus provides a more 
bespoke experience than broadcast radio but, in comparison to other kinds of streaming 
service, the important characteristic is that it is non-interactive: the listener does not choose 
what songs will play. The most established streaming radio service is Pandora, which 
announced in April 2013 that it had 200 million registered users in the USA, seventy million 
of which were ‘active’ each month (Peoples, 2013a).i The majority of Pandora’s income 
comes from advertising but it also has 2.5 million monthly subscribers paying a monthly fee 
to avoid ads and listening limits. Another prominent player in this field is iHeartRadio,a 
mixture of traditional radio services and Pandora-like tailored recommendations, created by 
terrestrial radio provider Clear Channelii, and boasting fifty million users (Solsman, 2014).. 
The second kind of streaming music service are locker services such as iTunes match 
and Amazon’s Cloudplayer. In these services, users can listen to ‘their’ music directly from 
the internet, either songs that they upload directly to the service’s servers or that are 
automatically ‘matched’ (to, for example, a user’s Amazon CD purchases). Locker services 
thus offer mobile access to a listener’s entire MP3 collection. However, they are a relatively 
small part of the cloud-based music landscape and, in all likelihood, a temporary 
phenomenon, designed to ease consumer experience until the ‘purer’ forms of cloud-based 
services are adopted more widely. 
The third kind of streaming music services are “on-demand.” Such services are 
similar to streaming radio services such as Pandora with one crucial difference: the listener 
chooses what music is played. They are thus interactive rather than non-interactive. As 
such, they provide a listening experience similar to locker services, except that choice is not 
limited to an individual’s collection: instead the listener can choose from a vast catalogue of 
music (upwards of thirty million songs on some services). Spotify has established itself as the 
most famous of these services but there are other significant providers. The most important 
of them is Deezer, the second largest on-demand service with sixteen million active users 
and six million subscribers (Peoples, 2014a). It has garnered fewer headlines than Spotify 
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because it has strategically avoided entering the mainstream US market but is the most 
global service, available in 180 countries. Other services include Rhapsody (until the 
emergence of Spotify, the largest subscription service in the US, with two million 
subscribers), US-based Rdio and WiMP, based in Norway.iii 
{page break in VoR} 
On-demand services often include radio functions so there is some overlap between 
services but the most important distinction is the one between non-interactive and 
interactive services. Within the music industry it is widely accepted that on-demand services 
are heralding a significant reconfiguration of recorded music consumption, from being based 
on ownership of music to being based on access, renting rather than buying records. This 
acceptance reflects the manner in which streaming music has begun to enter the mainstream 
in recent years. This can be seen in the global expansion and accelerating growth in 
user/subscriber figures among the aforementioned services but, probably more significantly, 
in the way in which the major internet companies are now becoming involved in the on-
demand streaming market. For example, Amazon offers a limited streaming service as a 
benefit to subscribers of its Amazon Prime service, while Google actually provides two 
streaming subscription services: Google Play Music All Access, and YouTube’s Music Key 
serviceiv On top of this, Apple, a long-time rejecter of streaming music, purchased Beats 
Music (primarily a headphone manufacturer but with a small on-demand streaming music 
service) in May 2014 and launched its own on-demand streaming service in June 2015. 
 
The backlash against Spotify 
 
The broader issues discussed in this paper, concerning the changing nature of the 
musical commodity and the economic reward for recorded music, are applicable to all of 
the on-demand streaming services. This paper will focus on Spotify, however, given that it is 
the most prominent of such services and the one which has been the centre of public 
debate about the levels of remuneration received by artists for streaming. The service was 
launched from its native Sweden in 2008 and it currently offers a catalogue of ‘over 30 
million tracks’ in 58 countries (Spotify, 2014). In January 2015, Spotify announced that the 
service had achieved sixty million active users and fifteen million paying subscribers (Spotify, 
2015). Its growth in subscriber numbers has been impressive: according to public 
announcements, it took almost two years to get its first 500,000 subscribers but then added 
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two million in approximately a year, a further 3.5 million in the following eighteen months, 
four million more in the next fourteen months and five million more in just seven months. It 
is growing exponentially and is the poster boy of the new, optimistic, digital record industry 
– the one that has stopped bleating about piracy and is doing something new and funky. Yet 
despite, or perhaps because of, its success, Spotify has also received a large amount of 
criticism, most notably from artists about the levels of remuneration they receive from the 
service. 
The public discussion of Spotify payments first began in 2009, when it was widely 
reported that Lady Gaga had received a payment of just $167 for her song Poker Face, 
which had been streamed over a million times (for example, Smith, 2009).v The statistic was 
misleadingvi but the mud stuck – it is easy to find recent stories repeating the bogus fact (for 
example, Marsden, 2012) – and the idea that Spotify did not adequately reward artists 
gained public credence. It was around the time that Spotify launched in the US in 2011 that 
the controversy surrounding payments became more consistent as a number of smaller US 
record labels withdrew their catalogues from the service. Seemingly the first to do so 
(though not the first to announce it) was Projekt Records, a Brooklyn-based gothic rock 
label, formed in 1983, which withdrew its catalogue from all on-demand streaming services 
in July. Label founder Sam Rosenthal stated that these services ‘are not a viable way forward 
for the music industry’ and was vocal in his criticism of Spotify: 
{page break in VoR} 
In the world I want to live in, I envision artists fairly compensated for their 
creations...Spotify is NOT a service that does this. Projekt will not be part of this 
unprincipled concept. 
 
For a stream on Spotify... on average $0.0013 is paid to Projekt's Digital 
Distributor. 5000 plays generates around $6.50. In comparison, 5000 track 
downloads at iTunes generates $3487. ... To earn the U.S. monthly minimum 
wage - $1160 - 892,307 plays a month are needed at Spotify. This is not a viable 
number for artists (Rosenthal, 2011). 
 
The next label to pull its catalogue out of Spotify, and the first to be publicly reported, 
was Century Media, a metal label based in Dortmund and California. In August they 
announced the withdrawal of its repertoire, along with its associated labels, ‘to protect the 
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interests of its artists’. While praising Spotify as ‘a great tool to discover new music’, 
Century countered that: 
 
‘Physical sales are dropping drastically in all countries where Spotify is 
active....Since the artists need to sell their music to continue their creativity, 
Spotify is a problem for them. This is about survival, nothing less and it is time 
that fans and consumers realize that for artists it is essential to sell music to 
keep their heads above water’. 
 
Century concluded that ‘Spotify in its present shape and form isn't the way forward. 
...Ultimately, in some cases, it will completely kill a lot of smaller bands that are already 
struggling to make ends meet’ (Century Media, 2011). 
More label withdrawals followed. Curiously, metal labels, especially LA based metal 
labels, seemed the most keen to remove their catalogs from Spotify. In September 2011 
Napalm Records withdrew their repertoire, stating that ‘the income generated through 
streaming is so insignificant that neither we, as a record company, nor our artists are able to 
further support this method of distribution. We... object to price models that endanger our 
existence and that of our bands’ (see Metal Underground, 2011) Also withdrawing in 
September 2011 were Prosthetic Records and Metal Blade, while Sumerian Records 
withdrew most of its catalogue in November. Beyond the LA metal scene, a more widely-
publicised story emerged in November when ST Holdings, a UK digital distributor for 
independent electronic and dance labels, withdrew from on-demand streaming services the 
catalogues for 234 of the 238 labels it distributed. In announcing their withdrawal, the 
company highlighted that, in the third quarter of 2011, their digital revenues dropped for the 
first time in their history (by 14%) and that iTunes income in particular was badly affected, 
falling by 24%. During the same period, on-demand streaming services accounted for 82% of 
‘plays’ of their music, but just 2.6% of revenues, with Spotify returning £2500 for 750,000 
streams. This low rate led the company to voice concern that the value of music was being 
undermined, stating that ‘music loses its specialness by its exploitation as a low value/free 
commodity. Quoting one of our labels, “Let's keep the music special, fuck Spotify”’ (in 
Resnikoff, 2011). 
 




It is important to keep these examples in context. The withdrawal of a handful of 
small independent labels is not going to cause too much of a dent in a catalogue of thirty 
million tracks.vii It is also worth noting that some of these companies (such as Century) have 
subsequently returned their catalogues to Spotify. However, the controversy about the 
amount of money paid to artists by streaming services has continued, especially among 
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some smaller independents and DIY artists.viii Broadly speaking, the complaints can be 
characterised in two ways. Firstly, musicians argue that on-demand streaming services 
undermine sales of digital files and physical media and, therefore, they are not a financial 
model that can sustain their musical careers. Underpinning this, however, is a broader 
aesthetic and moral argument about what music should be worth, with the micro-payments 
generated by each stream being seen as devaluing music itself. 
I will return to these issues shortly but, first, I want to outline the two ways in which 
Spotify has responded to such criticisms. The first is to argue that, for many artists, the 
amount that they receive from Spotify reflects their contract with their record label and not 
the amount that Spotify pays out (eg, in Rosenthal, 2011).ix There is some truth to this and it 
is important to recognise that the question ‘how much does Spotify pay artists?’ is 
somewhat misleading given that Spotify does not ‘pay artists’ any more than a physical 
record store ‘pays artists’. Instead, Spotify pays labels, or distributors handling labels and, as 
such, what proportion of that money is returned to artists is a matter of individual (though 
often standardised - see Stahl, 2013:165-170) contracts. It is necessary to be cautious, 
therefore, of information circulated online about the amount a particular artist received 
from streaming. However, there is obfuscation in Spotify’s response also.x Not all of the 
artists raising concerns have record label contracts, with many instead using digital 
distributorsthat charge a flat rate commission which makes it possible to ascertain what 
Spotify actually paid out. A large number of these independent artists have made significant 
efforts to provide reliable data on streaming rates (for example, the cellist Zoe Keating and 
the aforementioned David Lowery, who maintains a ‘streaming price bible’ on his 
Trichordist blog). Furthermore, the fact that independent labels, and not just individual 
artists, have been complaining about the revenue received from on-demand streaming 




Aside from claiming contractual confidentiality, Spotify’s main public response to the 
issue of royalties has been to provide some really big figures – the global amount that it has 
returned to rights holders. In 2012 Spotify founder, Daniel Ek, stated in an interview that 
‘the whole debate about artists payments is slightly misconstrued. We have paid out over 
half a billion dollars to rights holders now, and that's doubled in the last nine months. That's 
a significant amount of money’ (in Dredge, 2012).xi The word “misconstrued” is quite 
deliberate because the argument being made is that artists and the media are wrong to treat 
on-demand streaming services as comparable to sales. Spotify has repeatedly argued that it 
‘does not sell streams, but access to music. ... [It] is not a unit based business and it does 
not make sense to look at revenues from Spotify from a per stream or other music unit-
based point of view. Instead, one must look at the overall revenues that Spotify is 
generating’ (in Houghton, 2011). Thus, the really really big or the really really small numbers 
get to the heart of those different ways of understanding streaming services.  
To be clear, this is not merely an argument that it is impossible to equate a certain 
number of streams with one purchase. Rather, it is an argument that the nature of what is 
being sold is qualitatively different than in the past and, therefore, artists need to reconsider 
how they are rewarded – not merely how much they are paid but the basis on which they 
are paid: in the ‘old’ model of music-buying/owning, consumers paid (and artists therefore 
received) a one off payment; in the new model of music-renting, consumers continually pay 
for access to music. The theory is that continual small payments will compensate (and more) 
for the withdrawal of the one-off payment. That is why Spotify argues that ‘people need to 
transition from unit-based thinking to consumption-based thinking’ (in King, 2012). 
{page break in VoR} 
 
The economics of streaming music 
 
While Spotify’s position reflects a broader cultural shift toward ‘renting’ music, its 
argument that musicians should move away from ‘unit-based thinking’ is seemingly 
undermined by the fact that musicians are paid on the basis of how many times their songs 
are streamed by the service. In fact, Spotify royalty statements list each stream and its 
associated rate (though Spotify refers to calculating per-stream rates as ‘reverse 
engineering’). Understanding Spotify’s position that it is wrong to focus on individual streams 
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requires an understanding of the broader economic logic of streaming, which depends upon 
the totality of streaming rather than the aggregation of individual streams.  
Before explaining Spotify’s payment system it is important to recognise that Spotify 
does not seem to be ‘cheating’ by paying a lower royalty rate than other digital suppliers. At 
SXSW in 2012, Spotify’s Chief Content Officer, Ken Parks, reported that the company pays 
out ‘in the neighbourhood of 65-70% of revenue to rights holders’ (in Peoples, 2012a) and it 
has repeatedly affirmed that it pays ‘nearing 70%’ or ‘approximately 70%’. The 70% figure is 
important because it is what Apple returns to rights holders for iTunes downloads and it 
broadly matches historically conventional allocation in the record industry.xii So while not 
confirmed precisely, Spotify is at least paying rights holders a broadly conventional rate for 
the right to use music. It distributes money by dividing its revenue total by the number of 
streams played on the service. However, the amount of revenue Spotify generates relies 
mainly upon the number of subscribers it has (plus a little extra from advertising), whereas 
the number of times music can be streamed is effectively limitless. Thus when this amount 
paid is compared to the overall number of songs streamed, the numbers look 
embarrassingly small - the broad average from the information posted online is about $0.004 
per stream (0.4 or 0.5 cents per stream, although streams get different rates of return 
according to a variety of factors, most notably whether it is played by a subscriber or 
someone using the free service). Given the tiny figures quoted from musicians on per-
stream basis, or the ’30,000 streams only earned me $120’ stories, it is understandable that 
musicians might be concerned about the amount of money they are receiving. How can 
Spotify suggest that streaming is a viable option for artists? 
Spotify’s answer to the question is scale. Given the company pays a fixed proportion 
of revenue back to rights holders then, as Spotify’s overall revenue increases so, too, does 
the amount of money returned to rights holders (70% of a billion dollars is more than 70% 
of ten million dollars). That means that scale is key to the viability of Spotify and similar 
services: the more free users it can convert into paying subscribers the greater the level of 
return to artists and labels, not because more people are playing their music but because 
there is a bigger pie to share out and the effective per-stream rate thus increases. This can 
actually be seen in the royalties data that has been shared online: whereas the average rate 
per stream was initially in the region of $0.002 to $0.003 per stream (as can be seen in Sam 
Rosenthal’s statement quoted earlier), today it is $0.004 to $0.005. Ek announced in 
November 2014 that ‘500 thousand listens on Spotify would pay out between three and 
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four thousand dollars’ which is an effective per-stream rate of $0.006 to $0.008 (Ek, 2014a). 
The logic of the Spotify model has thus shown signs of working, though it remains to be 
seen whether services can scale sufficiently to provide a viable means of income for 
musicians. According to Spotify’s Artist in Residence D A Wallach, that particular tipping 
point is achievable, stating that ‘if we can get to the scale of Netflix – which has 20 million 
subscribers – we estimate we’d be paying out to artists what iTunes is paying out on a year 
to year basis’ (in King, 2012).xiii  
{page break in VoR} 
Artists are thus being told that they are wrong to treat streams like sales and that 
they should adopt a patient, long run view. Yet while large labels with cash reserves can 
potentially ride out the storm, artists who need money to live on now argue that streaming 
is undermining their current income by cutting into their digital sales. Both Century Media 
and ST Holdings made explicit reference to the fact that income from digital sales had fallen 
dramatically since the emergence of on-demand streaming. Spotify’s position, perhaps 
unsurprisingly, is that streaming does not have a detrimental effect on digital sales. For 
example, Katie Schlosser, a director of label relations at Spotify, has stated that they have 
been able to provide labels with ‘data that’s proving and demonstrating the fact that 
streaming revenue is additional to actual unit download consumption or physical music sales’ 
(in Resnikoff, 2013). Perhaps more surprisingly, the argument has been supported by the 
major record labels. For example, at an IFPI event in London in 2012, the president of 
Universal Music Group’s global digital business, Rob Wells, described the argument that on-
demand streaming ‘cannibalises’ sales as ‘absolutely bogus’ (in Peoples, 2012b).  
2012 was a good year to claim that streaming does not undermine sales, as overall 
revenue for the recording industry increased for the first time this century, if only by 0.3% 
(IFPI, 2013). There were also individual instances where streaming and selling seem to have 
complemented each other well. For example, one of the biggest albums of 2012 – Mumford 
and Sons’ Babel – became the most streamed album on Spotify in its first week of release 
(‘around eight million listens’) while simultaneously recording the highest first week sales for 
a US album that year (600,000 units) (Peoples, 2012b). Furthermore, there are specific 
territories where streaming has played a significant role in the local recording industry 
returning to growth after more than a decade of decline. For example, in Norway (where 
streaming accounted for 65.3% of recorded music revenues in 2013) the industry grew by 
7.2% in 2012 and 10.6% in 2013 (IFPI Norge, 2014) while in Sweden (where streaming 
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contributed 71.2% of recorded music revenues in 2013) the recording industry has seen 
three years of consecutive growth (IFPI Sverige, 2014). 
 Given their distinctive characteristics (small markets with high broadband 
penetration and the home of two of the major streaming services), it is unclear whether 
these Scandinavian examples are reliable indicators of future trends in much bigger music 
markets.  Most notably, neither country had well-established paid download services prior 
to streaming services emerging (Mulligan, 2014b). This makes them very different from the 
US and UK, where download services were contributing between 40 and 50% of recorded 
music income by the early 2010s. And, revenues from download sales declined in the US for 
the first time in 2013 (Pham, 2014) and the UK in 2014 (Titcomb, 2015). Critics of 
streaming services were quick to attribute the blame to Spotify (for example, Titcomb’s 
headline was ‘UK music downloads in decline for first time as Spotify eats into iTunes sales’), 
though Ek (2014a) contends that to do so is to confuse correlation with causation. Instead, 
he points to Canada, where download sales were falling before streaming services emerged. 
It should also be noted that growth in download sales had been flattening out considerably 
since 2008 (which Mulligan (2014c) attributes to increased spending on apps).  
In the long run, it seems reasonable to assume that the changing nature of the 
musical commodity means that streaming will replace downloading but it is difficult to make 
predictions about the speed and the nature of the transition as current data is ambiguous. 
Nonetheless, ‘while industry executives initially refused to attribute the early signs of 
weakness in digital sales to the rise in streaming, in the second half of 2013 many conceded 
that ad-supported and paid subscription services did seem to be cannibalizing digital sales’ 
(Christman, 2014a).  
{page break in VoR} 
 
Spotify and the mainstream industry 
 
 Despite concerns that streaming music could be undermining digital sales, the major 
record labels (Universal Music Group, Sony Music Entertainment and Warner Music Group) 
have been very supportive of both Spotify and on-demand streaming more broadly. Many of 
the bigger independent labels, such as Beggars Group and XL, have also been supportive of 
the service. The majors’ support of Spotify is in stark contrast to the early years of the 21st 
century, during which they were hostile to the emergence of digital music and ultimately had 
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to be bullied by Apple into committing themselves to the digital marketplace (Knopper, 
2009:170-177). What has changed in the meantime to effect such differing responses?xiv  
Understanding the change in attitude requires understanding the changing contours 
of piracy in the last fifteen years or so. In the early 21st century, the record industry’s 
overwhelming concern was that digital files generated massive amounts of piracy which 
undermined legitimate sales. Initial responses to these developments involved searching for 
ways in which music could be ‘locked’ through Digital Rights Management systems and 
aggressive litigation campaigns, against both companies involved in piracy (such as Napster) 
and individual downloaders (Marshall, 2012). Around 2005, however, the record industry 
changed its approach to online music consumption. While still publicly criticising piracy and 
campaigning for improved copyright enforcement, the record industry apparently accepted 
that it would have to adapt to consumer behaviour. The challenge for the labels was finding 
a way to incorporate the behaviour of a generation who had grown up with music being 
free and accessible. This has been Spotify’s key selling-point: it has consistently presented 
itself as offering a platform which ‘monetises’ existing consumer behaviour. In its response 
to the withdrawal of the Century and Mute catalogues, Spotify stated that the service: 
 
was launched out of a desire to develop a better, more convenient and legal 
alternative to music piracy. Spotify now monetises an audience the large majority of 
whom were downloading illegally (and therefore not making any money for the 
industry) before Spotify was available (in Bruno, 2011). 
 
The connection between Spotify and piracy is less than coincidental: Spotify founder Daniel 
Ek was formerly CEO of uTorrent, the most popular client for bittorrent sharing and the 
Spotify software itself depends on the peer-to-peer technologies that facilitate widespread 
file-sharing (when a user requests a song, encrypted data is transferred from other users’ 
computers) (Greeley, 2011). Despite this heritage, however, a major selling point of on-
demand streaming services is that they are generating income for rights holders out of 
consumer behaviour that had previously generated none.xv 
However, surely the main reason for the major labels’ support of Spotify and similar 
services is that the ‘consumption based’ logic of streaming services actually fits the logic of 
the pre-digital record industry quite well. The success of the major labels has always 
depended upon ‘consumption-based’ rather than ‘unit-based’ profits; their strategy was to 
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release lots of records in the knowledge that only a small number of them would be 
successful, but that the rewards from a small number of hits would outweigh the losses of 
the remaining releases. Thus, from the major label’s perspective, so long as some records 
made a profit, it did not matter which records sold a lot and which did not. It mattered to 
the careers of specific individuals (the artist, say, or the A&R executive that signed them), 
but not to the label overall, whose success depended upon overall levels of music 
consumption. 
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The correlation between the ‘consumption based logic’ of the major labels and 
streaming services can be seen in the way that royalty payments are calculated, which is 
inherently beneficial to those with large catalogs. Spotify’s payments are based on a ‘market 
share’ system. Simplifying slightly, the basic logic of the system is that an artist is paid a 
percentage of Spotify’s overall revenue determined by the percentage of overall streams 
that the artist accounted for in a particular month (Spotify, 2013).xvi There is thus no 
connection between an individual listener’s payment and their listening preferences. This is 
beneficial to artists and labels who receive a high number of streams because it means that 
they receive a high proportion of income regardless of how many paying users actually 
streamed their music. For example, if a listener pays £10 but listens to only one obscure 
Finnish rapper for the entire month, the rapper will still only receive a very small proportion 
of the listener’s money as the majority of it will be distributed to those artists at the top of 
the Spotify charts. Independent and less popular artists would benefit from an alternative 
system of payment that directly distributed an individual’s subscription to only those artists 
to which the individual had actually listened. 
 
Conclusion 
  The specific complaints about royalty rates raised by independent musicians and 
labels reflects, after a period of uncertainty, some significant structural recalibrating of the 
recording industry. Rather than internet technologies providing liberation from old industry 
dynamics, what we may be seeing is a consolidation of long-established power structures (as 
predicted by Burkart and McCourt (2004) though not via the precise mechanisms they 
suggested; see also Rogers, 2013). Furthermore, the introduction of streaming may be 
making the ground outside of the mainstream even more uncertain given that independent 
artists and labels do not have the luxury of extensive back catalogues and are much less 
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insulated against declining sales. If streaming is ‘cannibalising’ sales, therefore, it will be 
disproportionately impacting upon smaller players. Artists signed to bigger labels can be 
insulated against the changing rhythms of payment for recorded music – if, say, it takes five 
years of streaming income for an album to recoup its costs rather than two years of sales 
income, those with larger catalogues/financial reserves will be able to weather the storm. 
However, even if streaming services can scale sufficiently to offset the global decline in 
incomes from record sales, Spotify’s current payment system seems skewed towards the 
major labels. 
Thus despite the seemingly radical shift from ownership to access-based models, the 
business model of on-demand streaming is one with which the major labels are familiar and 
which suits their existing strategies. It is unsurprising that they have been supportive of the 
new services. Indeed, this support has gone beyond the realm of public statement as the 
major labels are actually shareholders in Spotify: financial filings reported in 2009 state that 
the major labels have a 16.5% in Spotify, with Merlin, an aggregator for the biggest 
independent labels, owning a further 1% (Arrington, 2009; Jerrang, 2009).xvii Furthermore, in 
late 2012, Access Industries, owners of Warner Music Group, invested $130 million dollars 
in Deezer for an undisclosed stake. This, again, is a repeat of earlier industry structures, in 
which each of the majors owned their own CD distribution companies (Negus, 1999:55-60). 
Needless to say, the fact that the labels have a stake in Spotify has merely added to the 
suspicion and distrust towards the company and its royalty system. The lack of transparency 
in the entire system has been something that Spotify has tried to address (through its 
Spotify Artists portal), but they remain limited in information  
{page break in VoR} 
they can release and streaming royalty statements remain incomprehensible to even the 
most seasoned analysts. 
From this perspective, the concerns raised by artists and independent labels about 
royalty payments from Spotify seem very similar to arguments made about the record 
industry in the past and, rather than being a ‘disruptive technology’ (Barr, 2013), Spotify and 
other streaming music services may actually (or also) be quite conservative technologies. 
There are historical precedents here. In Pop Song Piracy, Barry Kernfeld argues that the 
history of copyright infringement in the music industry follows a repetitive pattern: new 
technologies or social practices emerge which undermine music rights holders’ established 
forms of profit-making, who respond by yelling ‘piracy!’. The public recognises genuinely 
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transformative new practices from blatant copying, however, and, in such cases, rights-
holders end up having to adapt to the new practices yet, in doing so,  find ways of 
incorporating them into their existing profit-making practices (2011:2-4).  
Though the story is not complete, it is relatively easy to fit the story of digital music 
into such a narrative, with on-demand streaming services being the chapter in which the 
powerful corporations begin to incorporate the disruptive practices and reassert 
dominance. The recorded music landscape in the streaming era is beginning to bear many 
similarities to that of the CD era: financial success depends upon scale and catalogue, the 
major labels have a stake in music distribution networks, and the vast majority of artists 
don’t make any money. 
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provocative posts on a range of music industry issues. 
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agreements which make it impossible to ascertain how much, and in what ways, specific labels are 
renumerated. It is commonly accepted that the major labels received lump sum payments for making their 
catalogues available on the service and that this income is not shared with artists. 
xi In Ek’s public response to Taylor Swift, he announced that Spotify has paid $2bn to rights holders (Ek, 2014a) 
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certainly examples of countries, most notably Spain, in which rates of piracy have reduced as adoption of 
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factors, such as the dramatic rise in web takedown notices and the growth of YouTube, will have played a part 
in declining piracy rates. 
xvi The actual equation offered by Spotify is ‘Spotify’s monthly revenue x (artist’s Spotify streams/total Spotify 
streams) x approximately 70% to rights-holders’. 
xvii According to Arrington, Sony owns 5.8%, Universal 4.8%, Warners, 3.8%, EMI 1.9% and Merlin 1%. 
Presumably, Universal assumed EMI’s share when it completed its takeover in 2012. There is dispute over how 
much the labels actually paid for their stakes: Jerrang contends that it was just €8,800 (implying they received 
shares in exchange for licensing their catalogues) while Arrington disputes this, claiming inside sources state 
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